probably disruptive, manner. If I am correct, then it is better to go directly to the no-controls era now rather than to reach it after another set of "phases."
This position rests on my interpretation of events since August 15, 1971, and on my predictions of what will happen if controls are reimposed. The discussion below consists, therefore, of a look back and a look forward.
A Look Back
Newspaper accounts suggest that Phases I and II are widely regarded as having been successful. Econometric evidence also suggests that controls had an effect; wages and prices apparently rose less rapidly during the controls period than would have been predicted from equations estimated on precontrols data. ' What we have experienced in Phase III might be called the "exit problem" -how to emerge from the control regime, once it has been introduced.
Phase III was apparently an attempt to begin the exit from controls before control-induced distortions became severe. The exit, however, is proving difficult. Price increases during Phase III are being generated by three principal forces. First-still assuming that prices at the end of Phase II were below what they otherwise would have been-is the catch-up phenomenon. Second, aggregate economic activity has been rising very strongly, creating demand pressures in an increasing number of sectors. Third, since the Phase III decontrol was not unequivocal, some price increases are likely to be motivated by anticipations of the imposition of a new set of tight controls.3 These points will be discussed in turn.
The catch-up phenomenon was a predictable consequence of ending controls. It may be argued that the catch-up would have had no opportunity to manifest itself had Phase II (or something like it) been continued indefinitely. This view implies that controls can be effective indefinitely, a view discussed in the next section.
Another argument is that the catch-up need not have occurred at all. If the decontrol had been handled more skillfully, some will say, the gains from deflating wages and prices could have been retained. Needless to say, I am very skeptical about this argument. In any event, the catch-up phenomenon has not in fact been avoided. Price increases in early 1973 have been substantial. As a result, the annual rate of inflation as measured by the consumer price index (all items) over the period from August 1971 to March 1973 was 4.0 percent, only a little below the 4.4 percent rate from July 1970 to July 1971. If Phase III continues in its present form, it seems likely that by the end of 1973, at the latest, the price level will be unambiguously higher than it would have been had controls never been adopted.
The second factor now generating large price increases is the increasing number of sectors experiencing excess demand as a result of the vigorous economic expansion since August 1971. Some may argue that the controls have made this expansion possible, and that the reduction in unemployment is a major success for the controls program. Although the catch-up process may erode the price level gains of the control program, the claim will be that the employment gains are an obvious success.
I cannot agree. Both the employment problem and the inflation problem must be viewed in a longer-run context than simply the past eighteen months. What the nation must avoid is the boom-recession-boom roller coaster. Little is to be gained from less unemployment now at the expense of more unemployment later. If anything, the expansion in economic activity has been somewhat too vigorous over the past six quarters. It is not clear that the current boom can be slowed without causing another recession.
If The third factor underlying price increases during Phase III is widespread anticipation of a new set of controls. Businessmen know that a Phase IV-possibly another wage-price freeze-is a very real possibility. It is obviously in the interest of every businessman to push his prices as high as possible to secure an advantage in the event of another freeze. To some extent businesses are forced to act in this way for fear that their prices will be frozen at levels that are relatively low compared to those of their suppliers. Anticipating a freeze, firms selling perishable goods may even take spoilage losses rather than sell at lower prices.
The importance of anticipations is also suggested by the relative behavior of the wholesale price index (WPI) and the consumer price index (CPI) in the months of Phases I and II. Over this period, the WPI rose substantially faster than the CPI, contrary to the historical relationship revealed in Table 1 . The larger increase in the WPI-an index based on list pricesthan in the CPI-an index based on transactions prices-over the controls period may be the result of market weakness that prevents increases in list prices approved by the Price Commission from being passed through to actual transactions prices.5
To the extent this argument is correct, Phase II had less impact on prices than appears on the surface. Furthermore, by the end of Phase II many firms apparently had obtained approvals from the Price Commission that would permit increases in transactions prices when markets strengthened further. Leaving aside the question of evasion, by December of last year the stage was set for an acceleration of inflation even if the Phase II regulations had continued in force.
I am convinced that there is no stable halfway house for the American economy between tight controls and no controls. Continuing anticipations that tight controls will be reintroduced will foster additional inflation, waste resources by distorting relative prices, and generate unnecessary political conflict. If there is no halfway house, the alternatives are a return to controls, or an end to our involvement with them. In summary, then, a look back gives good reason for believing that the U.S. economy is now in more difficulty than it would have been had the pre-Phase I policies of no controls and moderately expansionary monetary and fiscal action been continued. The distortions and administrative costs of controls, and the extensive uncertainty attending the exit process, have bought at best minor and temporary gains in reducing inflation. I suspect that these uncertainties will worsen the short-run trade-off between unemployment and inflation. The legacy of controls will make it more difficult to achieve economic stability over the next few years.
A Look Forward
Viewing Phase II as a success, many want to bring back that type of control machinery. If we go back, I predict that the machinery will appear at first to be operating successfully, but will break down decisively in a relatively short period of time. The apparent success will stem from the fact that price changes during Phase III will have eased some of the strains that developed during Phase II. However, the honeymoon is likely to be shorter than it was last time because Phase III is producing its own distortions and because the economy is now operating with much less excess capacity than it was in August 1971.
The public pressure for a new set of controls has, to a considerable ex-tent, resulted from large increases in the prices of food, especially meat. These increases cannot be attributed to monopoly power in the private economy. Taken together, agriculture, food processing, and wholesale and retail food distribution constitute one of the most competitive sectors of the U.S. economy. A major cause of rapidly rising food prices is the expansion in demand for food spurred by increases in personal income. Because of the lags in agricultural production, the supplies now reaching the market were determined by planting and livestock decisions made twelve to twenty-four or more months ago. With rapidly rising demand and a substantial decline in grain available for the domestic market, food prices had only one way to go. Price ceilings on meat and other products will do nothing to expand production; indeed, by reducing incentives for higher output, controls will tend to hold production below what it otherwise would have been and to encourage increased exports to more lucrative markets abroad.
The widespread pressure for controls on food prices suggests how little the public understands such controls. My earlier paper repeated the standard arguments concerning the distortions introduced by controls. These arguments still hold. The distortions, evasions, and inequities of controls ensure that they cannot solve the inflation problem. The same factors will, I predict, eventually stir a profound public reaction against controls. Phase II provides two illustrations of the evasions and distortions generated by controls that are perhaps more forceful than the abstract arguments against them. One is the lumber industry. Here price control was rendered largely ineffective by evasion. A second is the oil industry, where price control was probably effective, but only at the cost of significant distortions.
The attempt to control lumber prices during Phase II was largely unsuccessful, because for the most part the controls, where binding, were evaded. The examples of evasion described below may be considered "unconfirmed reports," precisely because confirmed reports probably would have resulted in legal prosecution of the firms involved.
Several devices were employed to evade the controls. First, since the regulations permitted higher prices when services were added to products, plywood producers performed the "service" of cutting 1/8 inch off plywood sheets and sold the sheets for substantially higher prices. The dimensions of lumber products were also shaved as a device to obtain effective price increases.
Second, since the Price Commission could not control foreign producers, and import prices were thus uncontrolled, producers in the Pacific Northwest exported lumber to Canada and reimported it at substantially higher prices. In some cases the transactions involved dummy exports: export and import papers were processed while the lumber sat in a U.S. warehouse.
Third, Price Commission regulations that permitted normal markups at each stage of distribution spawned shipments of lumber from one wholesaler to another; each added a normal markup but did not perform all of the usual wholesaler functions.
Finally, at least for a time, the regulated price on two-by-fours was relatively high as compared with boards; thus, logs were turned into two-byfours and a shortage of boards developed. Other distortions in the product mix no doubt also occurred.
The lumber and wood products category of the WPI rose by about 13 percent from December 1971 to December 1972. Since this index is based on list prices obtained from firms, the true increase was probably much higher: Firms evading price control are not likely to report prices accurately to a government agency. Even though substantial price increases were permitted by the control regulations, lumber has been a constant source of difficulty. To a considerable extent the controls have simply ratified what market pressures were accomplishing anyway; where the ratification was incomplete, evasion finished the job of bringing prices into line with market realities, albeit with some distortions.
In the case of oil, price control compounded difficulties caused by the restriction of imports, concern over the environmental implications of new refineries, and the long-standing regulation of the price of natural gas. During Phase II, the price ceilings on fuel oil and gasoline established in Phase I remained in force.
The problem of petroleum products prices has two components. First, the prices of refined products were not permitted to rise sufficiently to restrain rapidly growing demands and to stimulate extra production. Second, the ceilings were set in such a way that the price of gasoline rose relative to the price of fuel oil. Refineries biased production toward the more profitable product, and shortages appeared in fuel oil in the fall of 1972. Figure 1 shows the price of fuel oil (light distillate) relative to gasoline and relative to gas fuels (mostly natural gas) over the past four years. The fuel oil problem was aggravated by substantial increases in the price of natural gas, a price long controlled by the Federal Power Commission. In response to physical shortages and the rising price of natural gas, industrial users who had a choice switched to fuel oil, further depleting these stocks.
The top panel of Figure 2 makes it plain that refineries responded to the decline in the relative price of fuel oil by switching more of their production to gasoline. The solid line in the top panel shows the ratio of fuel oil to gasoline production month to month; the horizontal bars give the yearly averages.
As shown by the bottom panel of Figure 2 , the result was that fuel oil stocks rose much less rapidly than usual over the first ten months of 1972. By June it was clear that shortages would appear unless production rose substantially.
Shortages did in fact appear in the late fall and early winter, and would have been worse and more widespread had not the winter been a mild one in most parts of the country. Denver schools had to be closed for a time because of the shortage of heating oil. In some places part of the corn crop was lost for want of oil to operate corn dryers. An increase in the price of fuel oil was permitted in December, and further increases occurred in the early days of Phase III. Spurred by higher prices and governmental prodding, refineries expanded their production of fuel oil. Now the talk is of gasoline shortages in summer 1973. But gasoline shortages, in the sense of dry pumps at filling stations, can be avoided if the price of gasoline is permitted to rise. Less essential uses of gasoline will be curtailed by price increases, and refineries will squeeze out extra production.
These examples illustrate what can be expected on a much wider scale if tight Phase IV controls are established. In my earlier paper I emphasized the importance of relative price movements. There I showed that in the year ended June 1971 substantial changes in relative prices had taken place, as indicated by the dispersion of changes in various components of the WPI. Perry replied: "Thus Poole's reported dispersion in price behavior makes a good case for flexible controls and intelligent price guidelines. But it does not persuade me that suppressed excess demand would be a problem. We could, of course, create that problem for ourselves-say, by trying to hold the price of lumber in the midst of the current housing boom. But that straw man should not be the subject of discussion."8
Why did lumber not turn out to be a straw man? The answer is that price control is both an economic and a political problem. By "political problem" I mean not only the problem of maintaining controls in the context of partisan politics but also, and more important, the problem of maintaining broad public support for the control program. Public support was important because the program was based primarily on voluntary compliance.
Except for the correction of economically improper relative prices, the ideal control program would depress each individual price and wage by the same relative amount below what it otherwise would have been. Controls, then, would not change relative prices from their levels in an uncontrolled environment, but would simply depress the absolute price level below what it otherwise would have been.
The difficulty, in my opinion, is the inherent impossibility of predicting the required relative prices; thus, the most intelligent and disinterested control process available will not produce satisfactory results. Economists often find it impossible to explain the causes of changes in relative prices after they have occurred; and even when the basic causes are understood, 8. George L. Perry, "After the Freeze," BPEA (2:1971), p. 447.
